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Abstract. The existence of short-term monetary equilibrium in a frictionless
economy with suboptimal agents is proved for any (reasonable) given interest
rate. Separability ideas (as deﬁned in Decision Theory) are applied. Two
ﬁnancial markets are in operation: for bank contracts (deposits and credits)
and for shares.
1. Introduction
We consider a sequential model where the decision-makers (consumers and ﬁrms)
face a labour market, a market for commodities and two ﬁnancial markets: for bank
contracts (deposits and credits) and for shares. A ”bounded rationality” approach
is followed, i.e., it is supposed that the agents do not necessarily make ”optimal”
decisions, but rather ”acceptable” or ”suboptimal” ones. As in [6], what is meant
by ”suboptimal” is characterized by a set of behavioural assumptions.
Among the assumptions imposed on the preferences of the decision-makers ﬁgure
separability and dual separability conditions, as deﬁned in Decision Theory (v. [3]
for a survey).
Long ago it was realized that, as money has only exchange value, it can be made
to consist of convertible claims. In the words of Schumpeter ([12], p. 321), ”you
cannot ride on a claim to a horse, but you can pay with a claim to money”; in
the older words (1571) of Tomás de Mercado ([9], book 2, ch. 17), ”never men
distinguish morally in their business money from the right to have it, if, as I say, is
safe and liquid1”. In our model, there is a clearing house, in charge of the settling of
all payments in the economy, and a bank, representing all ﬁnancial intermediation.
The credit positions of the agents at the clearing house are money. Money has
to be homogeneous, in order to be determined only by its quantity, in terms of
standard units; the debit positions of the bank at the clearing house are formulated
in terms of ad hoc units, and so money is formulated in terms of (convertible claims
to) these units. The monetary units are taken as units of account for all prices in
the period and serve as standard of deferred payment.
Key words and phrases. Separability in Decision Theory, bounded rationality, short-term equi-
librium, monetary frictions.
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In the model, money is not a commodity or asset, and properly there is no (ﬁnal)
demand o supply of it. Nevertheless, there are prices of money (against labour and
all commodities and assets). These prices of money give a further degree of freedom
to the model (in comparison with historical commodity money).
We deﬁne monetary assets as those whose prices (in terms of money) are ﬁxed
by the bank (or the incumbent monetary authority). Gold has been in the past a
monetary asset, and one unit of money has been set as a ﬁxed quantity of gold.
The equations relating supplies and demands of monetary assets in equilibrium may
contribute to determining the general levels of prices. In our model, the relevant
equation will be equivalent to a condition on aggregate demand (provided that
the market for shares is in equilibrium too). Bank credits and deposits are the
monetary assets: the rates of interest are supposed to be set by the bank. The
quantities of monetary assets are endogenous, and the bank implements monetary
policy by setting the interest rates.
It is supposed that there are not transaction costs. On the other hand, the
possibility that agents have to maintain some amount of a particular monetary
asset in order to facilitate payments is admitted. This is a liquidity friction. As it is
the only possible transaction friction considered here, we call the model frictionless
if it does not exist (cf the deﬁnition of monetary frictions in [16]). At any rate,
this friction is not likely to have appreciable consequences on the workings of the
model.
In static equilibrium, both the income of the agents and their expenses are de-
termined simultaneously. In the real world, consumers make their expenditure
decisions on the basis of the income that they have secured before. On the other
hand, ﬁrms contract labour and invest in ﬁxed capital before the resulting in-
come arrives. There is an organizational ordering then, where income comes before
expenditure in the case of consumers and conversely in the case of ﬁrms. In the
model, the decisions determining income and expenditure are made in this sequence:
earning-then-expending, for consumers, and investing-then-earning for ﬁrms. Thus
decisions on salaries and dividends result in deferred payments.
We discuss temporary short-term competitive equilibria. In short-term equilib-
rium, the ﬁxed capital endowment of ﬁr m si ss u p p o s e dt ob eg i v e n .T h i se n t a i l st h a t
investment in ﬁxed capital has eﬀects on commodity demand, but the adjustment
of the production capacity does not take place within the period of the investment,
and thus the equality of demand and supply in the labour market is not necessarily
assured. The production system may not be able to employ all labour available, at
least paying at the level of the subsistence wage, either because the ﬁxed capital is
not up to it (out of lack of capacity or lack of eﬃciency) or because the ﬁrms limit
the employment of labour as the expectations on the commodity market are not
optimistic enough.
The existence of short-term equilibrium is proved for any (reasonable) given
interest rate. In particular, equilibrium exists in the frictionless case.
In models with an inﬁnite horizon, no equilibrium is possible if consumers have
an incentive to resort to credit because the successive postponement of the debt
payment (using new credit to pay interests) is allowed (Ponzi schemes). Three
procedures that have been considered in the literature to check debt-inclined con-
sumers into equilibrium have been debt constraints, transversality conditions and
exogenous collateral (v. [1]). In the model, the debt constraint approach is followed
for consumers. For ﬁrms, a ”Marx was wrong” assumption is imposed, accordingA FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 3
to which the aggregate ﬁxed capital investment of ﬁrms does not swallow up aggre-
gate expenditure, because the income of consumers acts as an anchor. The proof
of existence of equilibrium relies on a closed graph argument.
The discussion on the existence of equilibrium turns round two necessary equi-
librium conditions, which are orthogonality conditions.
The model is introduced in Section 2. The concept of short-term equilibrium,
and some necessary conditions, are considered in Section 3. Money and monetary
assets are discussed in Section 4. The existence of equilibrium is proved in Section
5. Some ﬁn a lr e m a r k sa r ei n c l u d e di nS e c t i o n6 .
Given two vectors x,y ∈ Rn,x≤ y means xi ≤ yi for i =1 ,...,n,a n dx<y
means xi <y i for i =1 ,...,n; the scalar product of the two vectors is denoted by
hx,yi.W ew r i t eRn
+ , {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0},a n dRn
++ , {x ∈ Rn : x>0}.
2. The model
We consider a sequential monetary closed economy where n consumers have
available l commodities produced by n0 ﬁrms, in each period t,w i t ht =1 ,2,...
Commodities are not necessarily perishable, but they can be sold only in the period
when they are produced. They can be bought by the consumers and the ﬁrms (as
investment in capital goods). Consumers and ﬁrms are agents of the economy.
There is a (central) bank. We contemplate the situation in a certain period t,
although this is not made explicit through subscripts or superscripts.
There are a labour market, a market for commodities and two ﬁnancial markets:
the bank market and the market for shares. Instead of through barter, the markets
operate through a payments system. The market contracts involve the exchange of
a good or asset for a payment. These contracts are not the only source of obligations
leading to payments, as it will be considered below. The obligations incurred by
the agents are always complied with.
Payments can be spot payments, when they are carried out exactly when they
are agreed to, or deferred payments, if they are to be implemented after they are
agreed to.
There is a clearing house centralizing the payments of the period. Each agent and
the bank have an account there, whose balance is zero at the beginning of the period
and has to be zero again at the end of it (v. (1), (2) and (3) below). Purchases are
paid by debiting the account of the buyer and crediting that of the seller, for the
same amount. The other payments are implemented analogously. All payments are
settled simultaneously at the end of the period. The credit positions of the agents
at the clearing house are money. The debits of the bank are formulated in terms of
ad hoc units. Money is formulated in terms of these units, which are taken as units
of account for all prices in the period and serve as standard of deferred payment.
The agents and the bank can issue loans. Both loans and shares are assets.
Loans last one period and are formulated in terms of the unit of account in period
(t +1 ) . The possibility of default is excluded. On the one hand, the agents can
issue loans to be bought by the bank, bearing interest at the rate ρ, resulting in
credit contracts. On the other hand, the bank can also issue loans to be taken by
the agents, resulting in deposit contracts. There are two sorts of deposits: demand
deposits and saving deposits,t h ef o r m e rw i t ht h er a t eo fi n t e r e s tρ0 and the latter
with the rate ρ.W ea s s u m et h a tρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that ρ = ρ + ς,f o rs o m ec o n s t a n tς ≥ 0,a n dt h a tρ0 =0 .T h u s o n l y ρ is to be4 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
determined. Now ρ can be freely set by the bank within I,w h e r eI ⊆ R+ is a
nonvoid given interval. The bank imposes no rationing in its deposit and credit
facilities. Following actual use, credits and deposits are measured by their cost
(e.g., 1/(1+ρ) units of credit (or deposit) correspond to 1 unit of loan: the promise
of payment in the period (t +1 )of 1 unit of account).
The capital of the ﬁrms is divided into dividend-providing equities, which can
be bought by the agents or the bank. Equities last indeﬁnitely (unless they are
redeemed), and in each period new equities can be issued (or old ones redeemed)
by ﬁrms. In period t, qk ∈ R+ is the (unitary) price of the equities of ﬁrm k,
and q , (q1,...,q n0). At the conclusion of period (t − 1), ﬁrm k has ﬁxed the unit
dividend υk ≥ 0 attributable to the equities of the ﬁrm circulating at that moment,
and payable in period t.T h eﬁrm also decides then how many equities it intends to
issue (or to redeem) in period t, leaving the total number of equities in circulation
at σk.W ew r i t eυ , (υ1,...,υn0), σ , (σ1,...,σn0), and assume that σ 6=0 .G o l d
bullion can be thought of as shares of a particular ﬁrm (with zero dividend).
The possibility that the mere possession of an asset should produce satisfaction,
apart from the yields and price expected in the future, is admitted.
Production takes time. All through the period, ﬁr m sh a v ei nu s et h es a m eﬁxed
capital, resulting from the investments of the periods before. Thus production
depends only on the labour employed; for the sake of simplicity, intermediate goods
are not contemplated. The decisions on labour (supply and demand) are made at
the beginning of the period, and it is then when the labour market takes place. All
the other markets meet simultaneously later in the period, at the time when credits
and deposits mature and all payments take place (including those of approved
dividends and agreed labour contracts).
The purchases in the market for commodities and the ﬁnancial markets lead to
spot payments. On the other hand, the contracts in the labour market and the
settlement of deposits and credits at maturity and that of approved dividends lead
to deferred payments.
The intended supply of labour of consumer j in period t is βj(w),w h e r ew is the
wage (for unit of labour). Thus the intended wage income is given by the function
γ0j : R++ → R+ deﬁned by γ0j(w) , wβj(w). The production function of ﬁrm k





+,w h e r eNk > 0 is the maximum labour capacity.
For given wage w ≥ w (where w > 0 is the minimum wage, which prevails through
custom or law), the intended demand for labour of the ﬁrm is α0k(w) ≤ Nk,a n d
the vector of commodities that it intends to produce is e0k(w) , ξk(α0k(w)).T h e r e
can be diﬀerent decision criteria to make this decision (by considering proﬁt, sales,
...); at any rate the ﬁrm will have to make predictions on the behaviour of the
commodity market and the ﬁnancial markets in the period.
After the operation of the labour market, let the wage be in fact e w and consumer








as wage income. We do not assume that these values actually correspond to an
equilibrium of supply and demand. They are taken as data when the agents faceA FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 5
decisions for the other markets in period t,e v e ni fw ed on o tr e ﬂect it explicitly in
the notation. We write e ,
n0 P
k=1
ek, and assume that e>0.
The bank announces the value of ρ after the labour market has ended (before
that, the agents have to resort to estimations).
In period t, given equity prices q and commodity prices p , (p1,...,pl),c o n s u m e r
j makes estimations about the future and has to decide: how much he deposits in
the bank (and how much of it in a demand or in a saving account), how much he
borrows from the bank, the portfolio of shares, and the commodity bundle in the
current period. The ﬁrst three decisions involve the ﬁnancial aspect (implying how
much to spend), and the last one the spending aspect (i.e., how to spend it). The
preferences of the consumer are given by a vector of functions (d1j,d 2j,c j,f j,z j):
Rl
++ × Rn0
++ → R+ × R+ × R+ × Rn0
+×R
l
+ deﬁned for pairs (p,q),w h e r ed1j(p,q)
represents the desired demand deposits, d2j(p,q) the desired saving deposits, cj(p,q)
the desired credit from the bank (corresponding to the desired supply of loans to be
taken by the bank), fj(p,q) the desired portfolio of shares (fjk(p,q) corresponds to
the number of shares of ﬁrm k), and zj(p,q) the desired commodity bundle when
the amount to be spent is that determined (after the ﬁnancial decisions) by (p,q).
We denote dj , d1j + d2j.
Firm k faces also decisions in the markets for deposits, credits and commodities.
Now d0
1k(p,q) represents the desired demand deposits in period t, d0
2k(p,q) the
desired saving deposits, c0
k(p,q) the desired credit from the bank, f0
k(p,q) the desired
portfolio of shares, and z0
k(p,q) the desired commodity bundle (produced by the
other ﬁrms) to be used as capital goods. Thus the preferences of the ﬁrm are given















As for the bank, f00(p,q) is the desired portfolio of shares and z00(p,q) the desired






+ and a correspondence κ : Rl
++ × Rn0
++ ³ R+ ×
R+ × R+,w i t hκ(p,q) ⊆ R+ × R+ × R+, κ(p,q) 6= ∅.I f(d1,d2,c) ∈ κ(p,q),t h e n
d1 represents a desired supply of demand deposits in period t, d2 a desired supply
of saving deposits and c a desired credit (corresponding to a desired demand of the
loans issued by the agents).




































Given (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ × Rn0





00(p,q) , hp,z00(p,q)i, ωj(p,q) , hq,fj(p,q)i, ω0
k(p,q) , hq,f0
k(p,q)i, ω00(p,q) ,
hq,f00(p,q)i,f o rj =1 ,...,n, k =1 ,...,n0,a n dΨ(p,q) , hp,Z(p,q)i, Ω(p,q) ,
hq,F(p,q)i. Thus consumer j intends to spend ψj, ﬁrm k intends to invest ψ
0
k in
commodities (to be used as capital goods) of the other ﬁrms, etc. The bank has a
budget, and we assume that ψ
00(p,q)=ψ
00
,w i t hg i v e nψ
00
> 0.
Predictions aﬀect preferences; implicit in (d1j,d 2j,c j,f j,z j)(p,q) is the fact that,
for periods t0,w i t ht0 >t ,c o n s u m e rj (considering (p,q)) assigns, in period t,
probability distributions to the bank rate ρt0
, the vector of share prices qt0





0k(w), etc. The same applies analogously to ﬁrm k (also,
mutatis mutandis, to the bank), and to the preferences of both consumers and ﬁrms
concerning production and labour.
In period t, the values of parameters and magnitudes that obtained eﬀectively
in period (t − 1) are known. We shall simplify the notation by writing d0
1j for the
amount eﬀectively deposited in demand accounts by consumer j in period (t − 1),
or c00
k for the amount borrowed from the bank by ﬁrm k,e t c .I nt h i sw a y ,c00
k does
not represent a function, but a number. Note that, ex post, the realized values of
supply and demand coincide (e.g., σ0 = F0).
We can consider price indices (approximately Paasche) for commodity prices and
equity prices, with base period t0 <t , where the price vectors at that period satisfy
that pt0 > 0 and qt0 > 0. For a commodity price vector p we deﬁne the price index
P , hp,ei/hpt0,ei, and for an equity price vector q we deﬁne the corresponding price
index Q , hq,σi/hqt0,σi.N o whp,ei = λ0P,w i t hλ0 , hpt0,ei,a n dhq,σi = µ0Q,
with µ0 , hqt0,σi.
G i v e na ne q u i t yp r i c ev e c t o rq, the value of the shares of consumer j passed on





in period t. Thus his initial ﬁnancial wealth
in period t depends on the equity prices, and it is a function vj : Rn0
++ → R







. Before considering the ﬁnancial markets and
the commodity market, the amount available to the consumer is vj + yj,w h e r e







j is his income (after having settled interest and
dividend payments). Let aj(p,q) , dj(p,q) − cj(p,q)+ωj(p,q) be his desired
accumulated saving at the end of the period. We assume that the plans of the
consumer are consistent, i.e.,
ψj = vj + yj − aj (1)
In other words, the balance of his account in the clearing house is planned to be
zero at the end of the period. On the other hand, u0j , vj − a0
j is his speculative
gain, and thus aj − a0
j = uj + u0j,w h e r euj , yj − ψj is his intended ﬁnancing
capacity (for the rest of the economy), positive or negative. If it were supposed
that consumer j cannot have directly capital goods, uj would be his (ordinary, i.e.,
”non-speculative”) intended saving during period t.












k. The (gross ordinary) proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is
a function δk : Rl
++ → R depending on commodity prices, deﬁned by δk(p) ,







k , and its ”income” (also its gross saving) is
y0
k , δk − υkσ0




k(p,q) − qkσk.W e a s s u m e











k is the intended ﬁnancing capacity of the ﬁrm.
In the case of the bank, we deﬁne the function v00 : Rn0




. For the sake of simplicity, we take as both proﬁta n di n c o m et h e




2. Similarly as above, let a00(p,q) , ©
c − (d1 + d2)+ω00(p,q):( d1,d2,c) ∈ κ(p,q)
ª
. We assume that the plans of theA FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 7
bank are consistent, i.e.,
ψ
00 = v00 + y00 − a00 (3)
Thus a00 : Rn0
++ → R is singleton-valued. In order to guarantee (3), we deﬁne κ(p,q)
as the largest set such that this assumption holds2:
κ(p,q) ,
©
(d1,d2,c) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+ : c − (d1 + d2)=v00(q)+y00 − ω00(p,q) − ψ
00ª
for all (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ ×Rn0
++.W ed e ﬁne u00 , y00 −ψ
00; so the elements of κ(p,q) can
be characterized as those (d1,d2,c) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+ such that

















00 and the aggregate





















k(p)+y00 = hp,ei , for all p ∈ Rl
++ (6)
A sort of Walras’ law follows now from (1), (2) and (3):











k + u00 = A






































(An alternative to aggregate proﬁt could also have been deﬁned: aggregate proﬁt
excluding dividends, i.e., ∆ −
­
υ,F00®
). Since hp,ei = λ0P, it follows that the
aggregate proﬁtd e p e n d so np only through the corresponding index P.I n f a c t ,
2”It is the rule that the bank turns away a customer whom it considers deserving of credit
only if it is compelled to do so” ([14], III.5). Of course, in the real world the bank acts not only
through the rate of interest, but also by setting solvency conditions (and this aﬀects the amount
of credit). We suppose that the agents are blessed with moderation and restrain themselves up to
the point of incorporating the bank’s personal solvency conditions into their preferences.8 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
the aggregate proﬁt is a strictly increasing aﬃne function of the commodity price
















where the right-hand side of the equation, except for P, is already determined before




≤ ρ0C00), real proﬁts will
increase with (commodity) prices, and real wages will behave conversely.
3. Equilibrium and its necessary conditions
We recall that e w does not bring about necessarily the equality of demand and
supply in the labour market. At any rate, the adjustment of the value of the
parameters of the model may lead to the equilibrium of the other markets (the
two ﬁnancial markets and the commodity market): a short-term equilibrium.T h e
parameters to contemplate are either endogenous parameters (p, q) or the policy
parameter (ρ). Given ρ ∈ I,w ec a l lt h em o d e ld e ﬁned so far the short-term model
for ρ. Obviously the value of ρ aﬀects, e.g., the function cj(p,q);w h e nw ew a n tt o
reﬂect explicitly that cj changes with ρ,w ew r i t ecj(ρ;p,q);t h es a m en o t a t i o ni s
applicable to the other functions.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Consider the short-term model for ρ.Ap a i r(e p, e q) ∈ Rl
++×Rn0
++ is
called a short-term equilibrium pair if Z(e p, e q)=e, F(e p, e q)=σ and (D1,D 2,C)(e p, e q) ∈
κ(e p, e q).
The bank equilibrium condition (D1,D 2,C)(e p, e q) ∈ κ(e p, e q) is obviously equiva-
lent to the following:
(C(e p, e q) − C0) − (D(e p, e q) − D0)=u00 −
­
e q,f00(e p, e q) − f000®
(10)
Observe that the proportion of saving deposits and demand deposits in total
deposits is irrelevant in the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
A necessary condition for (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ ×Rn0
++ to be an equilibrium is obviously:
Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei (11)
In other words, P =( 1 /λ0)Ψ(p,q),w h e r eP is the index corresponding to p.C o n -
sidering (7), (11) is equivalent to
A(p,q)=0 (12)
Besides (11), another necessary condition for equilibrium is:
Ω(p,q)=hq,σi (13)
A third necessary condition for equilibrium is provided by (10):




Considering that loans are supposed to be intermediated by the bank, (14) is a
loanable funds equilibrium equation (although in the model shares are an alternative
to loans for raising and placing funds). In fact, the equation becomes, if the bank
is non-interventionist (as deﬁned above),
C(p,q) − C0 = D(p,q) − D0A FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 9
Equation (11), the expenditure equilibrium equation, concerns the level of aggre-
gate expenditure (alternatively, of saving (v. (12))); (13) concerns how much of the
aggregate saving (or dissaving) goes on shares and (14) how much goes on loans.
The three equations (11), (13) and (14) are equivalent to any two of them:
Proposition 3.1. Consider the short-term model for ρ. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent for (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ × Rn0
++:
(i) Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei and Ω(p,q)=hq,σi








Proof. Obviously A(p,q)=D(p,q) − C(p,q)+Ω(p,q) − ω00(p,q) − hq,σi + a00(q).
Hence, considering that a00 = v00 + u00,w eh a v ef r o m( 7 )t h a t
(C(p,q) − C0) − (D(p,q) − D0)=( Ψ(p,q) − hp,ei)+( Ω(p,q) − hq,σi)+u00 −
­
q,f00(p,q) − f000®
The result is now immediate.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the short-term model for ρ.Ap a i r(e p, e q) ∈ Rl
++ × Rn0
++
is a short-term equilibrium pair if and only if Z(e p, e q)=e, F(e p, e q)=σ.


















Roughly, the aggregate proﬁt equals distributed dividends (corresponding to the
previous period) plus (ﬁxed capital) investment of ﬁrms minus the ﬁnancing capac-
ity of consumers. The right-hand side of (15) or (16) depends on the value of ρ set
by the bank, and, beyond the short term, the ability to wield this power (including
the threat to use it) may allow the bank to exert inﬂuence on the agents acting in
the labour market (v. also (9)), in order to steer the level of wages, and also on the
ﬁrms deciding the amount of dividends.
4. Money
As said in Section 2, money provides the unit of account and the standard of
deferred payment. Altogether, money provides the standard of payment. Money is
not a commodity or asset, and properly there is no (ﬁnal) demand o supply of it. On
the other hand, there are prices of money, against labour and all commodities and
assets. The prices of money are aﬀected by the amount and structure of deferred
payments (e.g., those of salaries).
The prices of the credit and deposit loans are ﬁxed by the bank; thus we call
them monetary assets. Credit loans are issued by the agents and deposit loans
by the bank. The equations relating supplies and demands of monetary assets in10 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
equilibrium may contribute to determining the general levels of prices3.E q u a t i o n





− u00 =( D(p,q) − D0)
This equality can be interpreted in terms of supply and demand of money, if a suit-
able meaning (not our own) is assigned to these terms. In fact, C(p,q) corresponds
to a supply of loans by the agents in exchange of money, and it can be said that
represents a supply of money by the bank (or a demand of money by the agents).
I nt h es a m ew a y ,
­
q,f00(p,q) − f000®
− u00 c a na l s ob es a i dt or e p r e s e n tas u p p l yo f
money by the bank. Analogously, D(p,q) corresponds to a demand of loans by the
agents in exchange of money, and it can be said that represents a demand of money
by the bank (or a supply of money by the agents). Altogether, (14) stipulates that
the planned inﬂow and the planned outﬂow of money between the bank, on the one
hand, and the agents, on the other hand, are to be equal.
Note that, in double contrast with the Walrasian numéraire, here money is stan-
dard of deferred payment, and there are monetary assets.
Why are the agents willing to hold demand deposits without receiving interest
when they can opt for interest-yielding saving deposits? It was noted in Section 2
that the possibility that the mere possession of an asset should produce satisfaction,
apart from the yields and price expected in the future, is admitted. In fact, demand
deposits may provide a beneﬁt, liquidity, which is not contemplated explicitly in
the model. We say that the model is frictionless if no such beneﬁt exists, and thus
the actual amount of demand deposits is zero for all agents. At any rate, a change
on the part of the agents of the desired proportion between demand deposits and
saving deposits, provided that the total amount of deposits is kept, is not likely to
have much impact on the economy described by the model, apart from the eﬀect
on the proﬁt of the bank.
Recall the income version of the equation of exchange ([11]):
MV = PY (17)
where M is the quantity of money, V t h ei n c o m ev e l o c i t yo fc i r c u l a t i o n ,P the
implicit price deﬂator and Y national income. In the context of our model, the
right-hand side of this equation of exchange becomes the right-hand side of (11):
Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei
If behavioural assumptions are made about the variables in (17), the equation of ex-
change goes from identity to theory. The Cambridge Cash Balance Approach views
(17) as stating the equilibrium between the supply and demand for money. On the
3In general, we deﬁne monetary assets as those whose prices (in terms of money) are ﬁxed by
the central bank (or whatever monetary authority). Gold has been historically a typical monetary
asset, and one unit of money has been set as a ﬁxed quantity of gold. Then the demand for
gold has a ”monetary” component (coined gold), a ”pure asset” component (gold bullion) and a
”commodity” component (for jewellery, etc). Assuming full convertibility (including free coinage)
and certain hypotheses, a suitable equation relating the demand and the supply of gold could
arguably determine the level of prices. If only convertibility into coined gold (and no free coinage)
is considered, a similar equation for metallic money (coined gold) can be contemplated; Wicksell’s
quantity equation may be interpreted in this way.
In contrast with the case of the ”value” of gold, the variations in the general price level will
necessarily have a parallel eﬀect (often, an almost inversely proportional eﬀect) on the ”value” of
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other hand, Schumpeter [12] considers the ”Income Approach” to (17), where MV
is interpreted as aggregate demand, like the left-hand side in (11). An alternative
decomposition of aggregate demand as the product of an ”anchor” and a factor of
adjustment is provided in (21) below. In the next section we shall see that (11) and
(13) (where one of them can be replaced by (14), according to Proposition 3.1) play
the role that the equation of exchange plays in the Quantity Theory: to determine
the equilibrium price indices, while relative prices are determined elsewhere. Quite
naturally, separability conditions (in the words of Decision Theory) will have to be
assumed.
5. Existence of equilibrium
From Corollary 3.2, the necessary conditions for equilibrium considered in Propo-
sition 3.1,
Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei , Ω(p,q)=hq,σi (18)
become suﬃcient in the ”macroeconomic” case, i.e., when there is only one commod-
ity and one stock. Thus these necessary conditions deﬁne a sort of ”macroeconomic
equilibrium”. The gist of our approach to prove the existence of equilibrium will be
to show ﬁrst (18) and then, considering separability (in the sense of Decision The-
ory), rely on the market for commodities and the market for shares being internally
well-behaved.
Given two vectors of prices, p ∈ Rl
++ and q ∈ Rn0
++,w ei n t e n dﬁrst to conclude,
under suitable assumptions, that (18) holds for some prices λp and µq,w i t hλ,µ>0.
The wealth and income vj(q)+yj of consumer j do not depend on commodity
prices. Recall that vj : Rn0
++ → R is continuous. Considering that good banking
practices are internalized by the prudent consumer, we may assume that his in-
tended debtor position at the end of the period (i.e., −aj(p,q)) is bounded from
above (the bound depending on q):
(A.1) There is a continuous function aj : Rn0
++ → R such that aj(p,q) ≥ aj(q)
for all (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ × Rn0
++
This is the sort of standard assumption to avoid Ponzi schemes. An hypoth-
esis for ﬁrms analogous to (A.1) is not very plausible, as the existence of ﬁxed
capital alters solvency conditions (we do not contemplate consumers as having, as
such, a substantial amount of ﬁxed capital; they can always set up their own real
estate ﬁrm). However, it is reasonable to assume for ﬁrms that their aggregate
intended ﬁxed capital investment does not swallow up the aggregate intended total
expenditure (this is a ”Marx was wrong” proposition):
(A.2) There is ψ
0
< 1 such that (Ψ0/Ψ)(p,q) ≤ ψ
0
for all (p,q) ∈ Rl
++ × Rn0
++
The next assumption is a monotonicity property of the real aggregate intended
expenditure when commodity prices change homothetically. Recall that P is the
price index corresponding to p.
(A.3)
Ψ(λp,q)




Lemma 5.1. Consider the short-term model for ρ, and assume (A.1)-(A.3) and
that Ψ is continuous. Let p ∈ Rl
++. Then, for every q ∈ Rn0
++,t h e r ee x i s t so n e ,
and only one, π(q) > 0 such that Ψ(π(q)p,q)=hπ(q)p,ei. Moreover, the function
π : Rn0
++ ³ R++ so deﬁned is continuous.12 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
Proof. Let p ∈ Rl
++ and q ∈ Rn0
++.F r o m ( A . 2 ) , Ψ(p,q) ≤ (1/(1 − ψ
0
))(Ψ −






00), and thus, by (1) and (A.1),















00 > 0 (20)




where P , hp,ei/λ0. W eh a v et h a tηq is continuous. In view of (19) and (20),
and applying the Intermediate Value Theorem to ηq, it follows that there exists
λ
∗ ∈ R++ such that ηq(λ
∗)=λ0.B y( A . 3 ) ,ηq is injective, and so λ
∗ is unique in
satisfying Ψ(λ
∗p,q)=hλ
∗p,ei. Hence we can deﬁne π(q) , λ
∗.
N o ww es h o wt h a tπ has closed graph. Let (qh) → q be a convergent sequence
in Rn0
++ and (π(qh)) → λ.T h e n Ψ(π(qh)p,qh)=hπ(qh)p,ei.B y c o n t i n u i t y o f
Ψ,w eh a v et h a tΨ(λp,q)=hλp,ei,a n dπ(q)=λ.T h u s π has closed graph.
Now, π(q)=Ψ(π(q)p,q)/hp,ei. Considering (19) and (20), a compact co-domain
can be taken for the restriction of π to any compact domain, and therefore π is
continuous on compact domains. As Rn0
++ is locally compact, we conclude that π is
continuous.
Note that π varies with p, even if this is not made explicit in the notation. From
Lemma 5.1, given p ∈ Rl
++ and q ∈ Rn0
++, the relevant vector of commodity prices
is π(q)p.W e d e ﬁne the function Υ : Rl
++ × Rn0
++ → R by Υ(p,q) , Ω(π(q)p,q),
representing the aggregate intended outlay on shares keeping expenditure equilib-
rium, when the equity price vector is q and the relative commodity prices are given
by p.
The ”Income Approach” to (17) considers the decomposition of aggregate de-
mand as the product of an ”anchor” (M) and a factor of adjustment (V ). Assum-




yj, the income of consumers4.P r o v i d e dt h a tY0 > 0, and putting
V 0(p,q) , Ψ(p,q)/Y0, (11) becomes:
Y0V 0(p,q)=hp,ei (21)
In contrast with (17), here Y0 is not a stock magnitude, and V 0 cannot be interpreted
as a ”velocity”.
Observing at period t, and given commodity prices p and equity prices q,t h e
global rate of return of shares (considering dividends and capital gains or losses)
from period t to period t +1is for consumer j a random variable jb z:
jb z ,
hjb q + jb υ,σi
hq,σi
− 1 (22)
4In the real world, the budget of the public sector provides also an anchor.A FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 13
where jb q and jb υ are the estimators of equity prices and dividends for period t +1
(p and q are not made explicit in the notations of the random variables).
The agents will tend to buy shares if jb z is (in probabilistic terms) high enough
in relation to ρ (moreover, the agents may consider advantageous to borrow from
the bank if necessary to buy stock if j b z is high enough in relation to ρ). Roughly, a
reduction in Q (recall that Q = hq,σi/µ0) will produce this outcome on jb z provided
that it does not bring about an overcoming counter-eﬀect (in the extreme, a panic)
on the probability distributions of jb q and jb υ. A parallel argument is relevant for
low values of jb z. The following macroeconomic assumption (large numbers help in
probabilistic situations) is a boundary condition, considering the intended outlay
on shares in real terms. Here the hypotheses of Lemma 5.1 are supposed to hold.












Proposition 5.2. Consider the short-term model for ρ, and assume (A.1)-(A.4)
and that Ψ and Ω are continuous. Let p ∈ Rl
++ and q ∈ Rn0
++. Then (18) holds for
some prices p = λp and q = µq,w i t hλ,µ>0.
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, Υ(p,.) is continuous. From (A.4) and the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists µ∗ ∈ R++ such that Υ(p,µ∗q)/µ∗Q = µ0,w h e r e
Q = hq,σi/µ0.T h u sΥ(p,µ∗q)=hµ∗q,σi. Hence Ω(π(µ∗q)p,µ∗q)=hµ∗q,σi,a n d
the second equation in (18) holds for p = π(µ∗q)p and q = µ∗q. Now, by Lemma
5.1, Ψ(π(q)p,q)=hπ(q)p,ei,a n dt h eﬁrst equation in (18) is also satisﬁed for p and
q.
We turn now to the workings of the commodity market and the stock market.
We may assume that the desired commodity bundle zj(p,q) of consumer j in
the current period depends on q only through the planned expenditure ψj(p,q),
and analogously for the ﬁrms and the bank. This is a separability condition, in
the sense of Decision Theory. We may also suppose for the resulting functions the
usual hypotheses for demand functions. A similar assumption may be considered
for the stock market. Formally:
(A.5) (i) There exist functions ζj,ζ
0
k,ζ
00 : R+ × Rl
++ → Rl
+, j =1 ,...,n, k =









hp,ζj(x,p)i = x, hp,ζ
0
k(x,p)i = x, hp,ζ
00(x,p)i = x, , for all x ∈ R+
(ii) There exist functions ϕj,ϕ0
k,ϕ00 : R+ × Rn0
++ → Rn0
+, j =1 ,...,n, k =1 ,...,n 0,





hq,ϕj(x,q)i = x, hq,ϕ0
k(x,q)i = x, hq,ϕ00(x,q)i = x , for all x ∈ R+
We consider two boundary conditions, one of them for the commodity market
and the other for the stock market:14 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ





++), j =1 ,...,n, k =
1,...,n0,t h e n
lim
p→p












° ° ° ° ° °
→ +∞





++), x00(q) ∈ ω00(R+ × Rl
++), j =1 ,...,n, k =1 ,...,n0,t h e n
lim
q→q









° ° ° ° ° °
→ +∞
for all q ≥ 0 with qk =0for some k.
In the two following assumptions, P denotes the price index corresponding to
the price vector p (i.e., P , hp,ei/λ0), and analogously P for p, Q for q (i.e.,
Q , hq,σi/µ0)a n dQ for q. We may hypothesize that the aggregate planned
expenditure Ψ depends on the index of prices and not on the particular commodity
prices, and analogously for the stock market:
(A.7) Let p,p ∈ Rl
++ and q,q ∈ Rn0
++.I f P = P,t h e nΨ(p,q)=Ψ(p,q).I f
Q = Q,t h e nΩ(p,q)=Ω(p,q).5
It may be assumed that the aggregate demand for commodities depends on stock
prices only through their price index. In the case of the stock market, a similar
condition can only reasonably be assumed for the aggregate planned expenditure:
(A.8) Let p,p ∈ Rl
++ and q,q ∈ Rn0
++.I f Q = Q,t h e nZ(p,q)=Z(p,q).I f
P = P,t h e nΩ(p,q)=Ω(p,q).




k,ω00 are continuous, j =1 ,...,n, k =1 ,...,n0.
Lemma 5.3. Consider the short-term model for ρ, and assume (A.5)-(A.9). Then
there exists a short-term equilibrium pair if and only if there exists a solution of
(18).
Proof. We have already seen that (18) is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
Conversely, let Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei, Ω(p,q)=hq,σi. From Corollary 3.2, we have




We shall show ﬁrst that Z(e p,q)=e for some e p ∈ Rl
++.L e t θ0 : R
1+l
++ → R
and θ : R
1+l













00,p) − e,w h e r e
P , hp,ei/λ0 and P , hp,ei/λ0.T h u sθ , (θ0,θ) is continuous and homogeneous










00) − hp,ei =0 ,
considering (A.5) and (A.7). Moreover, if (b p0, b p) ≥ 0, (b p0, b p) 6=0 ,a n de i t h e rb pi =0
for some i or b p0 =0 ,t h e n
lim
(p0,p)→(b p0,b p)
kθ(p0,p)k → +∞ (23)
5A weakened version of (A.7) would be suﬃcient for our purposes, namely: If Ψ(p,q)=hp,ei
and P = P,t h e nΨ(p,q)=Ψ(p,q);i fΩ(p,q)=hq,σi and Q = Q,t h e nΩ(p,q)=Ω(p,q).A FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 15




since e>0 and b p 6=0 , and (23) also follows. From these properties of θ, we conclude
(by a well known result; v., e.g., 17.C.1 in [8]) that there exists (p∗
0,p ∗) > 0 such
that θ(p∗
0,p ∗)=0 .T h u shp∗,ei/p∗















00,p ∗)=e,w h e r eP∗ , hp∗,ei/λ0.L e te p ,
p∗/p∗
0; it follows that he p,ei = Ψ(p,q) and
n P
j=1







k((P/e P)e p,q), e p)+
ζ
00(ψ












k(e p,q), e p)+ζ
00(ψ








Next we shall see that F(e p, e q)=σ for some e q ∈ Rn0











be deﬁned by θ
0
















) is continuous and
homogeneous of degree zero, and θ
0(q0,q) ≥ (−Ω(e p,q),−σ) for all (q0,q). Similarly













k(e p,(Q/Q)q)+ω00(e p,(Q/Q)q)] −
hq,σi =0 .B e s i d e s , i f (b q0, b q) ≥ 0, (b q0, b q) 6=0 , and either b qk =0for some k or





° ° → +∞
From these properties of θ
0, we conclude now that there exists (q∗
0,q∗) > 0 such
that θ
0(q∗
0,q∗)=0 .T h u shq∗,σi/q∗











0ω00(e p,(Q/Q∗)q∗),q∗)=σ,w h e r eQ∗ , hq∗,σi/µ0.
Let e q , q∗/q∗
0; it follows that he q,σi = Ω(e p,q) and
n P
j=1





k(e p,(Q/ e Q)e q), e q)+ϕ00(ω00(e p,(Q/ e Q)e q), e q)=σ,w h e r ee Q , he q,σi/µ0.W e
have that e Q = Ω(e p,q)/µ0 = Ω(p,q)/µ0 = hq,σi/µ0 , Q,a n ds o
n P
j=1





k(e p, e q), e q)+ϕ00(ω00(e p, e q), e q)=σ. Hence F(e p, e q)=
n P
j=1




k(e p, e q)+
f00(e p, e q)=σ. Finally, by (A.8), Z(e p, e q)=Z(e p,q)=e.16 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
Note that the respective price indices of the solution pair of the necessary con-
dition (18) and the short-term equilibrium pair found in the proof are the same,
i.e., P = e P and Q = e Q. On the other hand, if (A.7) and (A.8) are assumed, Ψ and
Ω depend on commodity prices and equity prices only through the corresponding
price indices. Formally: Ψ(p,q)=Ψ0(P,Q),w h e r eΨ0 : R++ × R++ → R+,a n d
analogously for Ω. For the sake of simplicity, we denote Ψ0 also by Ψ,a n dΩ0 by
Ω, if no misunderstanding can arise. If also it is assumed that ω00(p,q) depends
on p and q only through the corresponding price indices, then, considering the
proof of Proposition 3.1, the same convention applies to (C −D),a n dw ec a nw r i t e
(C − D)(P,Q). Now (11), (13) and (14) become:
Ψ(P,Q)=λ0P
Ω(P,Q)=µ0Q
(C − D + ω00)(P,Q) − (C0 − D0 + hq,f000i)=u00
Recall that, by Proposition 3.1, these three equations are equivalent to any two of
them. The next corollary of Lemma 5.3 results from the preceding discussion.
Corollary 5.4. Consider the short-term model for ρ, and assume (A.5)-(A.9).
Then the solutions (P,Q) of
Ψ(P,Q)=λ0P , Ω(P,Q)=µ0Q (24)
are precisely the price indices corresponding to the short-term equilibrium pairs
(p,q).
Obviously (24) can be formulated as a ﬁxed point condition.
From Proposition 5.2 and Lemma 5.3, the existence of short-term equilibrium
follows immediately.
Proposition 5.5. Consider the short-term model for ρ, and assume (A.1)-(A.9).
Then there exists a short-term equilibrium pair.
Note that all the results are valid in the particular case that the model is fric-
tionless.
Am o d i ﬁcation of the model can be obtained eliminating the possibility of bor-
rowing and lending (but keeping the market for shares). We leave the alterations
to the reader (e.g., (A.1) and (A.4) drop). In the resulting model (11) is equivalent
to (13), and short-term equilibrium exists corresponding to every equity price level
Q. Also, there is no bank, with the consequences already indicated in Section 1. In
this alternative model, ﬁat money leads to indetermination.
6. Concluding remarks
Already in the 16th century Luis de Molina became aware that clearing could
perform the function of cash as a medium of payment. Speaking of fairs like that
of Medina ([10], Disputatio 409), he observed: ”However, I believe that usually,
the custom is to pay at the end of the fairs, when there is a ﬁxed time to pay oﬀ
those debts, formalizing through signed documents [chirographis]t h em a j o r i t yo f
the transactions that are previously carried out; since money is not so abundant that
it allows buying in cash [pecunia numerata] the enormous amount of merchandise
that is taken there to be sold if the payment is to be carried out in cash, nor thatA FRICTIONLESS ECONOMY WITH SUBOPTIMIZING AGENTS 17
it allows carrying out so many transactions”.6 In a modern economy, banks have
two diﬀerent functions. On the one hand, they are ﬁnancial intermediaries. On the
other hand, they provide the payment system of the economy. It is convenient to
separate both functions. In this paper we consider two centralized institutions: the
clearing house, in charge of the settling of all payments in the economy, and the
bank, representing all ﬁnancial intermediation.
The monetary units are taken as units of account for all prices in the period and
serve as standard of deferred payment. Altogether, money provides the standard of
payment. ”If a serious monetary theory comes to be written, the fact that contracts
are made in terms of money will be of considerable importance” ([2], p. 357).
Apart from the transaction liquidity friction considered in the model, there is
in the real world another liquidity friction that we do not contemplate because
we assume that there is only one bank, to be taken as the central bank. If a
complex hierarchical banking system is assumed instead, with a central bank at the
top and private banks below, the credit positions in accounts at the central bank
(e.g., banknotes) are considered more liquid than those at the private banks. By
managing this superiority, the central bank is supposed to be able to control, to a
large extent, the behaviour of private banks, providing the banking system with an
adequate level of unity7.
The question has been asked whether ﬁnancial innovations, particularly those
related with information and communication technology, may lead to the demise of
central banking (v., e.g., [4], [5], [15]). In the frictionless case, could the bank be
disposed with? In this case, the bank serv e st w of u n c t i o n si nt h em o d e l . F i r s t l y ,
by setting the units in which its debit positions are formulated, the bank ﬁxes the
standard of payment. Secondly, all borrowing and lending is intermediated through
the bank. In the ﬁrst function, the bank could be replaced, at least in theory, by
any solvent agent (and all agents are supposed to be solvent in the model). In
the second function, it could be thought, prima facie, that no intermediation is
necessary, and that the interplay of demand and supply of private loans would do.
However, the absence of bank means chaos. Given any (reasonable) interest rate,
short-term equilibrium exists for some general commodity price level P and equity
price level Q. There is nothing like one equilibrium interest rate. Through the
intermediation of borrowing and lending, the bank is able to set the interest rate
and thus to aﬀect the level of prices. Moreover, all this happens in the short term,
where the income of the consumers is known before prices are determined. Beyond
the short term, the ability to wield the power of setting the interest rate (including
the threat to use it), may allow the bank to exert inﬂuence on the agents acting in
the labour market, in order to steer the level of wages (v. (9) and (15)), and also
on the ﬁrms deciding the amount of dividends.
6”Arbitror autem regulariter esse in more positum, ut in ﬁne nundinarum soluantur, praescrip-
tumque esse certum tempus ﬁnitis, aut fere ﬁnitis nundinis, eiusmodi solutionibus, atque ante id
tempus quam plurima chirographis peragi, eo quod non sit tanta copia pecuniae, ut tam ingens
mercium multitudo, quae eo deferuntur, ac venduntur, pecunia statim numerata emi possit, atque
ut tam multa negotia pecunia ultro citroque in eis expediantur”. The English translation above
is in [7].
7How this control is implemented, and with what success, is an institutional issue that has
changed along history. About the present situation, we agree with [13]: ”In an open and eﬃcient
ﬁnancial system, the central bank can determine the market rate of interest by standing in the
market at its own rate, and rely on interest rate arbitrage to transmit that rate to the market”.18 JOSÉ MANUEL GUTIÉRREZ
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